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Introduction
In Scandinavian and Northern European nations today, 
as well as most coastal regions of the United States and 
many parts of Australia and New Zealand, a growing num-
ber of individuals do not believe in supernatural entities 
and reject religion in general. However, surveys show that 
supernatural beliefs are on the rise worldwide, an increase 
driven by resurgent religion in Africa, Asia, and most of 
the Americas (Berger 1999, Johnson 2010, Pew Research 
Center 2015). Why is widespread rejection of supernatu-
ral worldviews so rare, historically speaking? And what is 
so unusual about the social contexts within which post-
supernaturalism becomes widespread?
Several social theories have attempted to describe 
pathways through which a culture can shift away from 
supernatural religiosity and toward post-supernaturalist 
secularity, many of which enjoy significant empirical sup-
port. After an exhaustive literature review, we identified 
the following six as being (1) the most influential, (2) the 
most relevant to interpreting the emergence and stabi-
lization of post-supernatural cultures, and (3) the most 
empirically well supported.
•	 The Existential Security Path (e.g. Inglehart, Norris)
•	 The Cultural Particularity Path (e.g. Putnam, Campbell)
•	 The Human Development Path (e.g. Norris, Inglehart)
•	 The Meaning Maintenance Path (e.g. Berger)
•	 The Subjectivization Path (e.g. Heelas, Woodhead)
•	 The Supply-Side Path (e.g. Stark, Finke, Iannaccone)
Although some champions of these theories view them as 
inherently competitive or even mutually exclusive, we argue 
that these mainstream theories offer partial  perspectives 
on a more complex architecture of causal factors driving 
changes in the religiosity and secularity of human popula-
tions. We are not alone. Ruiter and van Tubergen, for exam-
ple, have attempted to show how (what we are calling) the 
existential security and supply-side paths can be “taken 
together” to “provide insights into differences in initial 
conditions, path dependency, and the reason why religious 
trends are sometimes reversed” (2009, p. 889). Probably 
the most ambitious attempt so far to produce a unified the-
oretical model is Stolz (2009), where correlations between 
aspects of some of the theories above (and some others) are 
explored using multi-level multiple regression modeling, 
though Stolz doesn’t take account of post-supernaturalism 
as a dependent variable. Such integrative attempts are rare, 
and none developed to date illustrates concretely how the 
causal elements of all these theories can function together. 
It is important to note that we selected these six theories 
before trying to integrate them, and let the chips fall where 
they may as to whether integration would be possible and 
whether the meaning of the resulting synthesis would tell 
us anything interesting about transitions between super-
natural religion and post-supernaturalist secularity.
We synthesize the core elements of these theories into 
a consistent conceptual architecture and implement the 
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The abandonment of supernatural religious beliefs and rituals seems to occur quite easily in some con-
texts, but post-supernaturalist cultures require a specific set of conditions that are difficult to produce 
and sustain on a large scale and thus are historically rare. Despite the worldwide resurgence of supernatu-
ralist religion, some subcultures reliably produce people who deny the existence of supernatural entities. 
This social phenomenon has evoked competing explanations, many of which enjoy empirical support. We 
synthesize six of the most influential social-science explanations, demonstrating that they provide com-
plementary perspectives on a complex causal  architecture. We incorporate this theoretical synthesis into 
a computer simulation, identifying conditions under which the predominant attitude toward supernatural-
ism in a population shifts from acceptance to rejection (and vice versa). The model suggests that the con-
ditions for producing widespread rejection of supernatural worldviews are highly specific and difficult to 
produce and sustain. When those conditions combine, which is historically rare, a stable social equilibrium 
emerges within which post-supernaturalist worldviews are widespread; however, this equilibrium is easier 
to disrupt than equilibria whose cohesion is stabilized by supernatural religion due to persistent cognitive 
tendencies toward supernaturalism in evolved human minds.
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resulting model in a system-dynamics computer simula-
tion. This allows us, first, to demonstrate the coherence 
of the synthesis, as implementation in a computational 
simulation imposes demanding requirements of concep-
tual clarity and consistency. The simulation also allows 
us to identify plausible conditions under which a popula-
tion with a majority of individuals embracing supernatu-
ral beliefs (we will use supernatural religious to refer to 
this posture, which explicitly excludes naturalist forms of 
religion; again, the focus here is on supernaturalism, not 
religion) changes to a population in which most individu-
als have learned to contest inbuilt cognitive tendencies 
toward supernaturalism, thereby becoming “post-super-
naturalists” (we will call this posture post-supernatural 
secular, referring both to personal views and to a cor-
responding form of socio-political organization where 
beliefs in and practices related to supernatural agents 
play no role; the unwieldy name is warranted to avoid 
confusion). The same simulation also indicates plausible 
conditions under which a society moves in the opposite 
direction (i.e. from post-supernaturalist secular to super-
naturalist religious). Moreover, our computational model 
provides insight into the means by which supernatural 
religious coalitions and secular post-supernaturalist coa-
litions might inhibit or catalyze social transformation in 
either direction.
Computational modeling and simulation is a relatively 
new tool in social science, where it was introduced after 
it proved its worth in other fields, especially engineering 
(see a 2005 themed issue (110/4) of American Journal of 
Sociology, Iannaccone and Makowsky 2007, Squazzoni 
2012). Simulation is a fruitful substitute for experimen-
tation when (as with many social issues) experiments 
are impossible or unethical, the periods concerned are 
too long, or datasets spanning many decades are not 
available. Conceptually, computer simulation is not so dif-
ferent from demographic projection: both model a set of 
hypothetical scenarios by working out the implications of 
specific assumptions.
We refer to the computer simulation presented here as 
FOReST (an acronym for the “future of religious and secu-
lar transitions”). FOReST indicates that the conditions for 
producing widespread rejection of supernaturalist religion 
are highly specific, hard to produce, and difficult to sus-
tain because they are individually necessary. When those 
necessary conditions combine, which is historically rare, 
there emerges a stable social equilibrium within which 
most people can contest maturationally natural cognitive 
tendencies to embrace supernatural thinking and behav-
ing. Because it requires steady inputs of substantial energy 
to contest maturationally natural cognition and behavior, 
this post-supernatural social equilibrium may be easier to 
destabilize than more common social equilibria that take 
advantage of maturationally natural cognitive tendencies 
toward supernatural beliefs and practices.
Synthesizing Sociological Theories of Religious 
and Secular Change
FOReST is built on a causal model that synthesizes six 
empirically supported theories of secularization pro-
cesses. As a simulation built upon these empirically well-
grounded theories, FOReST provides a plausible model 
of the complex causal processes that underlie transitions 
from religious to secular and vice versa in actual human 
societies. Each theory synthesized represents a different 
“path” in our model (however, readers should be clear that 
our model is a systems-dynamic model, not a structural 
equation or path model, as previously used in the seculari-
zation literature). These paths—represented by differently 
colored arrows of causation in Figure 1—are explained 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of synthesis of six theories of religious and secular change.
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below. Inglehart et al. (2008) used “path” to refer to lines 
of society-level change in the direction of human develop-
ment, inspired by the “paths” in the underlying structural-
equation model that is incorporated into FOReST. We 
mean something similar, though with a different target: 
the six paths are lines of society-level change in the direc-
tion of decreasing or increasing prevalence of supernatu-
ralism within a population.
The Existential Security Path is derived from theories 
rooted in data mined from the World Values Survey (WVS) 
and other datasets (e.g. Inglehart et al. 2008; Norris and 
Inglehart 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2012; Norris and 
Inglehart 2015; Norris and Inglehart 2019). According to 
Norris and Inglehart, differences in religious culture and 
changes in existential security predict shifts in personal 
religious values, beliefs, and behaviors. The Existential 
Security Path attempts to explain the way supernatural 
religiosity operates in a wide variety of cultural contexts, 
taking account of variations in religious cultures and 
demographics. It also tries to register the causally more 
determinate aspects of the effects of social change on reli-
gion (existential security changes religious values, which 
changes religious participation, which changes religiously 
motivated political involvement). Put simply, the basic 
argument here is that the more existentially secure a pop-
ulation feels the more likely belief in supernatural agents 
and participation in religious rituals will wane.
A second theory is expressed in what we are calling 
the Cultural Particularity Path. Here the focus is on the 
importance of particular religious cultures in determining 
religious values and religious participation. For example, 
Robert Putnam notes that the best predictor of religious-
ness in the United States is racial background (Putnam 
2001; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Campbell and Putnam 
2011a, 2011b). These insights are obviously based on con-
siderations specific to one nation. From this point of view, 
looking for cross-cultural causal dynamics linking social 
change and supernatural religious beliefs and practices 
may be a quest merely to isolate minor influences on secu-
larization rather than the most salient influences, the latter 
being more intricately tied to the historical details of each 
social setting. In plain language, demographic differences 
and sociological shifts of the sort described by Putnam and 
Campbell directly impact the rise or fall of supernatural 
religious values, beliefs, practices, and participation.
Third, the Human Development Path is based on a struc-
tural equation model (SEM) developed by Inglehart and 
Norris, utilizing WVS data (Inglehart and Norris 2012; 
Inglehart et al. 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2015). We were 
unable to replicate the SEM loadings for want of sufficient 
information about construct measures in the original cal-
culations but the pathway makes solid theoretical sense 
and we incorporate it into the synthesis on that basis. This 
path indicates how four elements of social change (social 
liberalization, democratization, economic development, 
and social stability) produce an increased sense of free-
dom, which in turn increases subjective wellbeing. WVS 
data show that the most salient factor at the beginning 
of the Human Development Path is economic develop-
ment, but with time economic development contributes 
less to subjective wellbeing than social liberalization and 
democratization. In other words, the processes that lead 
to the development of secularization begin with economic 
change and proceed (or intensify) with political and life-
style change. Inglehart and Norris’s original SEM stand-
ing behind the Human Development Path did not include 
social stability. We added social stability partly because it 
is an obviously relevant factor in individual freedom and 
subjective wellbeing, which decrease supernatural reli-
gious beliefs and practices, and partly because it helps us 
integrate the Human Development Path with the Existential 
Security Path. While much of the empirical warrant for 
these paths emerges out of analysis of similar datasets, the 
former path is more focused on freedom while the latter 
emphasizes the role of felt existential security.
A fourth family of theories is represented by the Meaning 
Maintenance Path, which is more directly informed by psy-
chology than most sociological theories. Peter Berger’s 
sociology of knowledge, for example, incorporates psy-
chological concepts such as the need to relieve the pain 
of cognitive dissonance and the drive to create meaning 
(Berger 1969, 1973). Similar approaches can be found 
in the hypotheses set out by Proulx and Inzlicht (2012), 
which build on the work of Festinger (1957) and others. 
Such theories also give social meaning to psychological 
concepts such as plausibility structures of the sort that 
typically emerge as a result of education in the sciences 
and humanities, which tend to diminish supernatural 
religious beliefs (Hungerman 2014; Dyer and Hall 2019). 
This is one aspect of classical secularization theory that 
we should preserve because these psycho-social dynamics 
are demonstrably active in human affairs (for a defense 
of classical secularization theory, see Bruce 2011, ch. 2). 
Indeed, meaning maintenance and the management of 
cognitive dissonance have more recently become key con-
cepts in cognitive science of religion, where they are incor-
porated into theories not only of the social and existential 
functions of religion but also of the evolutionary origins 
of religion (Guthrie 1993; Atran 2002).
The fifth pathway, the Subjectivization Path, is based 
upon the work of Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (Heelas 
and Woodhead 2000; Davie, Heelas, and Woodhead 2003; 
Woodhead and Heelas 2005). One of the most empiri-
cally sturdy results from these authors’ research is that, 
as individual freedom increases, people become less wary 
of incurring social penalties when they express their spir-
itual beliefs and decide whether and how to participate in 
religious communities. In contexts where freedom of reli-
gious expression is strongly curtailed, on the other hand, 
the secularization process rarely gets started and people 
tend to continue believing in supernatural agents and 
engaging in supernatural rituals proscribed by the domi-
nant culture. In other words, the extent to which beliefs 
about supernatural agents are “subjectified” (rather than 
institutionalized and monitored) impacts the extent to 
which individuals in a population maintain those beliefs 
and participate in traditional ritual practices associated 
with them.
The sixth and final path incorporated into our theoreti-
cal synthesis is meant to capture the insights of a family of 
supply-side sociological and economic theories (see, e.g., 
Stark and Iannaccone 1994, Finke and Stark 1998). We 
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call this the Supply-Side Path. These theories postulate a 
link between pluralistic cultural and religious settings and 
religious participation by means of competition-induced 
innovation in religious products (or services). This helps 
to explain why populations in some geographical regions 
tend to maintain the same basic levels of religiosity (or 
secularity) over time although individuals (with varying 
levels of religiosity or secularity) are constantly moving 
in and out of them (Iannaccone and Makowsky 2007). 
Such approaches are “supply side” (as opposed to “demand 
side”) insofar as they argue that the dominant factors 
incrementing or decrementing religiosity have to do with 
the conditions and variables associated with the providers 
of religious services (as opposed to the needs of religious 
“customers”). We argue that some aspects of these supply-
side theories can be understood as complementary to – 
and not only as competitors of – theories that emphasize 
the demand-side of religious participation.
Preserving the most empirically robust elements of 
each theory, we synthesized these six theories into a uni-
fied conceptual model that illustrates how those elements 
in the six theories are interconnected (Figure 1). FOReST 
has several feedback loops (illustrated in Supplementary 
Materials), so all variables interact. Nevertheless, we iden-
tify four variables (in the shaded area) as “key conditions” 
because they are salient mediators between generic socio-
economic conditions and supernatural religious or post-
supernatural secular worldviews.
Constructing models is one thing; determining whether 
this synthesized causal architecture makes conceptual 
sense is another. Such a determination is dependent on 
the empirically validated theoretical arguments to which 
we have already alluded. Plausibility can also be increased 
by exposing this novel architecture to the conceptual rig-
ors of implementation in a computational simulation. 
Building such a model demands precise specification of 
how the major components of the theory fit together. 
That process of clarification also requires us to make the 
model more specific in some places, and also to limit the 
scope of its applicability. One key to this is specifying the 
vague Religious Culture variable (Figure 1, lower left) so 
critical to the Cultural Particularity Path. We conceptual-
ize this variable in a way that encompasses dynamics that 
tend to produce liberal religious cultures or conservative 
religious cultures. All details of the conceptual model are 
included in the Supplementary Materials.
Implementation in a System-Dynamics 
Computational Simulation
To analyze the processes that lead to changes between 
supernaturalist religion and post-supernaturalist secu-
larism, we incorporated a conversion process into the 
synthesized causal architecture. The conversion process 
depicts post-supernaturalist secular and supernaturalist 
religious people being born and dying, and in between 
possibly converting from one posture to the other (Sup-
plementary Materials contain detailed diagrams). Peo-
ple begin life either as supernaturalist religious babies 
or post-supernaturalist secular babies, corresponding to 
their dominant family and cultural heritage (these family 
and cultural relationships are implied, not explicitly incor-
porated into the model). Supernaturalist religious babies 
have three possible fates:
•	 They grow up to be supernaturalist religious adults 
without significant exposure to post-supernaturalist 
secularism.
•	 They grow up to be supernaturalist religious adults 
even though they receive significant exposure to post-
supernaturalist secularism.
•	 They grow up to be post-supernaturalist secular 
adults because they receive significant exposure to 
post-supernaturalist secularism and actually convert.
•	 Likewise, post-supernaturalist secular babies may or 
may not be exposed to supernaturalist religion, and 
may or may not convert after exposure.
The way people move through the conversion process is 
affected by a series of flow rates, increasing or decreasing 
the corresponding direction of flow. Six key parameters 
in the conversion model determine flow rates, as follows.
•	 Religious Birth Rate (RelBirthRate): the birth rate of 
babies into supernaturalist religious family and cul-
tural settings.
•	 Secular Birth Rate (SecBirthRate): the birth rate of 
babies into post-supernaturalist secular religious 
family and cultural settings.
•	 Exposure of Supernatural to Secular Rate 
(ExposeToSecRate): the percentage of supernatural-
ist religious people exposed in a substantive way to 
post-supernaturalist secularism.
•	 Exposure of Secular to Supernatural Rate 
(ExposureToRelRate): the percentage of post-super-
naturalist secular people exposed in a substantive way 
to supernaturalist religion.
•	 Supernatural-to-Secular Conversion Rate (Con-
vertToSecRate): the percentage of supernatural-
ist religious people exposed to post-supernaturalist 
 secularism who convert.
•	 Secular-to-Supernatural Conversion Rate (Convert-
ToRelRate): the percentage of post-supernaturalist 
secular people exposed to supernaturalist religion 
who convert.
This conversion model also includes a measure of Resource 
Scarcity (ResourceScarcity). This is impacted by the 
parameter Carrying Capacity (CarryingCapacity), which 
sets the total number of people possible in the ecology of 
the model. The Resource Scarcity variable is also affected 
by the actual population by means of feedback loops that 
drive the model dynamics.
Verification is an important phase of developing a sys-
tem-dynamics computational simulation. One key ques-
tion is: Does the expected range of behaviors emerge for 
appropriate flow-rate settings? For almost all settings of 
the six flow rates, this conversion process converges on 
an equilibrium state in which the ratio of supernatural-
ist religious people to post-supernaturalist secular people 
remains constant. The line graph in Figure 2a depicts the 
relative sizes of the supernaturalist religious (traditional) 
and post-supernaturalist (secular) subpopulations and 
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displays the equilibrium as it emerges. To indicate how 
the conversion model works, suppose we set the six flow 
rates as in Figure 2a. The maximum supernaturalist reli-
gious birth rate (RelBirthRate) of 2.5 babies per person 
(the average is lower) and the average post-supernatural-
ist secular birthrate (SecBirthRate) of 0.9 babies per per-
son along with the middling post-supernaturalist secular 
exposure rate (ExposureToSecRate) and conversion rate 
(ConvertToSecRate) suggest a social situation in which a 
small secular enclave exists within a larger supernatural-
ist population. Figure 2b shows a combination of param-
eter settings that yields an equilibrium state with more 
post-supernaturalist secular people than supernaturalist 
religious people. The social setting implied here is one in 
which virtually all supernaturalist religious people (95%) 
are exposed to secular modes of life and thought, and a 
sizable minority (40%) convert. The other rates remain 
unchanged from Figure 2a.
This verification exercise shows that the conversion 
model produces the expected behavior when we control 
flow rates manually. The next challenge is to define the six 
flow rates automatically using the causal architecture of 
religious and secular change described in the previous sec-
tion. That is, the two birth rates, the two exposure rates, 
and the two conversion rates are inferred from the theo-
retical synthesis of Figure 1. For example, the flow rate 
governing the extent to which supernatural religious peo-
ple are exposed to post-supernatural secular worldviews is 
the average of technology, education, and pluralism (the 
way the flow rates are defined from the causal architec-
ture is specified in Supplementary Materials). The result is 
dynamism: the population equilibrium changes as the six 
flow rates are altered by the causal architecture. To make 
the feedback system work, we feed the proportion of 
post-supernaturalist secular people from the conversion 
process back into the causal architecture, where it plays 
a critical role (again, see Supplementary Materials). Thus, 
the two-way conversion process stands in a feedback loop 
with the causal architecture derived from the conceptual 
model of Figure 1.
Most of the nodes (rectangles) in the top of Figure 3 
(inside the Causal Architecture box) match constructs in the 
conceptual model (Figure 1). There are some changes and 
additions to the nodes, all forced by the goal of implement-
ing the theoretical synthesis of the causal architecture of 
religious and secular change in a coherent system-dynam-
ics model. We explain these modifications along with all 
model details in the Supplementary Materials.
Figure 2: a (top): The conversion process shows an emerging equilibrium between supernatural religious (orange) 
and post-supernatural secular (green) people. The horizontal axis is model time. The vertical axis is the number 
of people of each type. The equilibrium depicts a social situation in which a small secular enclave exists within a 
larger supernatural population. b (bottom): The conversion model’s emerging equilibrium with parameters set to 
yield more post-supernatural secular people than supernatural religious people. Only two parameters are changed 
between the two cases: the rate of exposure of supernatural religious people to post-supernatural secular worldviews 
(ExposeToSecRate) and the rate of conversion of supernatural religious people to post-supernatural secular 
worldviews (ConvertToSecRate).
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The main feedback loop in the top part of Figure 3, high-
lighted by red arrows, focuses on the Modernity variable 
(Modernity), which is a measure of the degree of “moder-
nity” present in a social setting, and should be interpreted 
by how it influences liberalization, democratization, 
development, stability, and religious cultures (of liberal 
and conservative types). The Modernity variable is incre-
mented by the Modernity Pro (ModernityPro) variable 
and decremented by the Modernity Con (ModernityCon) 
variable. These two variables sum the effects of the causal 
architecture that promote or suppress the emergence of 
characteristics of modern secular society, respectively.
The entire combined model has external parameters 
that typically stay fixed throughout a simulation run and 
effectively tune the model. Those parameters are arrayed 
on the left edge of Figure 3 and are as follows.
•	 Technology (Technology): the technological capac-
ity of the model world, which covers communica-
tion, transportation, agricultural, and manufacturing 
technologies.
•	 Destabilization (Destabilization): a quantified ex-
pression of disasters capable of destabilizing a so-
cial order (e.g. pandemics, environmental disasters, 
nuclear war). If the destabilization parameter is above 
zero, wellbeing, existential security, and education are 
all  negatively impacted.
•	 Rate of Social Change (ChangeRate): speeds up or 
slows down change in the Modernity variable.
•	 Lowest Threshold Possible for the Modernity Variable 
(ModernityMin): expresses the irreversibility of some 
degree of modern culture.
•	 Pro-Modernity Influence of Religion (Promodernity-
InflOfRel): reflects the fact that some supernatural-
ist religious beliefs and practices advance aspects of 
secular social life. For example, the booming Pente-
costal movement in South America accelerates pro-
cesses of liberalization and democratization, and the 
Protestant Reformation increased individualism and 
helped to give birth to Western modernity (see Bruce 
2011).
•	 Lowest Threshold Possible for Liberal Religious Cul-
ture (LibMin): reflects the irrepressibility of liberal 
impulses to individual liberty, social justice, and 
human-heartedness.
•	 Lowest Threshold Possible for Conservative Religious 
Culture (ConsMin): reflects the portability of socially 
borne plausibility structures that keep supernaturalist 
Figure 3: FOREST: The system-dynamics model using the causal architecture from the conceptual model of Figure 1 
to derive flowrate variables needed to drive a conversion process back and forth between supernatural religious and 
post-supernatural secular outlooks. Parameters fixed for a given run of the simulation are arrayed along the left side 
of the figure. The conversion process is the bottom part of Figure 3. The six flow-rate variables driving the conversion 
process are in the middle part of Figure 3, fed by the top part and feeding into the bottom part. The four key condi-
tions from the conceptual model (shaded in Figure 1) are lined up together in the middle of the causal architecture 
in the top part of Figure 3 and enclosed in a shaded box.
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religious cultures alive regardless of how secular and 
post-supernaturalist the surrounding culture becomes.
•	 Preferred Affluent Birthrate (PrefAfflBirthRate; de-
fault is 0.9 babies per person, a little below replace-
ment): expresses the preferred birth rate of people 
living with affluent levels of environmental calorie 
capture and is used to calculate religious and secular 
birthrates.
•	 Maximum Birthrate (MaxBirthRate; default maxi-
mum of 2.5 babies per person, with the average birth 
rate lower): is also used to calculate religious and sec-
ular birthrates.
•	 Resistance to Change (ResistChange): reflects the 
tendency of all people, and especially conservative 
people, to resist new ideas and experiences, and thus 
to resist conversion.
The formulas in the system-dynamics model of the causal 
architecture are as natural as possible (products are used 
when the input quantities are linked by a logical AND 
while averages are used when the link is a logical OR). 
Slightly more complex, but still natural, formulas express 
the way the Modernity Pro and Modernity Con variables 
are derived and how they in turn increment and decre-
ment (respectively) the Modernity variable. The formulas 
for the six variables feeding into the conversion model 
express commonsense interpretations of the two birth-
rates, the two exposure rates, and the two conversion 
rates. Those details are also available in the Supplemen-
tary Materials.
Results
Using AnyLogic version 7 (The AnyLogic Company 2015), 
we ran this model through a parameter sweep. We used 
Latin Hypercube sampling to identify representative 
combinations of parameter settings. We recorded the 
associated emergent equilibrium (i.e. the proportion of 
post-supernatural secular people) for each combination of 
parameters and then analyzed the vast dataset of results 
to generate insights into model dynamics and to produce 
comprehensible visualizations of those dynamics.
Figure 4a and 4b depict a response surface for the 
post-supernatural secular proportion of the population 
(SecProp). This response surface suggests that there are 
pathways leading to a population in which post-supernat-
ural secularism becomes the dominant posture. A sensi-
tivity analysis reveals that whether or not this transition 
occurs depends most strongly on high technology (the 
Technology parameter, which has a host of downstream 
consequences, including high ease of communication and 
population mobility, driving both pluralism and develop-
ment upwards), and a high tendency among people with 
supernaturalist religious worldviews to create conditions 
conducive to the rise of post-supernaturalist secular peo-
ple and societies (the PromodernityInflOfRel parameter; 
recall the examples of Latin American Pentecostalism 
increasing liberalization and democratization and 
Protestantism increasing individuality, thereby strength-
ening tendencies to Modernity). These pathways to the 
dominance of post-supernatural secularism are powerful 
enough to contend with the large disparity in birth rates, 
which were held at 0.9 for post-supernaturalist secular 
and significantly higher for supernaturalist religious peo-
ple in the response surfaces of Figure 4a and 4b.
As the level curves at the top of Figure 4a indicate, the 
post-supernatural secular population only goes past 50% 
if supernatural religious worldviews exercise a significant 
degree of influence (above about 0.5) in the direction of 
modern ways of life, other things being equal. Similarly, 
the proportion of the post-supernaturalist secular popula-
tion can only rise above 50% when technology passes a 
threshold around 0.4. The same information is presented 
in an illuminatingly different way in Figure 4b. This 
time the vertical axis displays the absolute value of the 
Figure 4: a (left): FOREST response surface for the proportion of the post-supernatural secular population as a func-
tion of the level of technology and the pro-modernity influence of supernatural religious worldviews. b (right): FOR-
EST response surface for the difference between the proportion of the post-supernatural secular population and the 
proportion of the supernatural religious population as a function of the level of technology and the pro-modernity 
influence of religious worldviews.
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difference between the post-supernatural secular propor-
tion and the supernatural religious proportion of the pop-
ulation, while the other two axes remain the same. When 
that absolute-value number is zero, the population is at a 
50–50 balance. At either side of the central ridge we see 
the two equilibrium regimes of the FOReST system: the 
historically common supernatural religious regime (on 
the right), and the historically rare post-supernatural secu-
lar regime (on the left).
The transition from the equilibrium regime of majority 
supernatural religious to the equilibrium regime of major-
ity post-supernatural secular is the most interesting aspect 
of FOReST dynamics. It is difficult to perch the system at a 
50–50 split; the model gravitates toward one of the stable 
equilibrium regimes. To examine this highly non-linear 
transition, we held all parameters constant except for 
technology (Technology), which we varied across its range 
(0 to 1). For each level of technology, we identified the 
equilibrium state. Figure 5a plots the equilibrium state 
for the post-supernaturalist secular (SecProp) and super-
naturalist religious (1–SecProp) populations against the 
technology variable.
As technology increases, driving up many of the other 
variables in the causal architecture, the population bal-
ance shifts, with post-supernatural secular people grow-
ing in number but remaining a minority in the entire 
population. Eventually, however, a threshold is reached (in 
Figure 5a, around Technology = 0.5) after which there is 
rapid transition to a new equilibrium regime with post-
supernatural secular people in the majority. Figure 5b 
shows actual population numbers instead of percentages, 
allowing us to see that a dominantly post-supernaturalist 
secular population produces a lower overall population 
(due to lower secular birthrates). The transition in the 
other direction, from a dominantly post-supernatural-
ist secular population to a dominantly supernaturalist 
religious population displays similar highly non-linear 
threshold behavior.
The dynamics of real-world social change are far more 
complex than can be expressed in a simple simulation 
such as FOReST. For example, system-dynamics models 
often involve two equilibrium regimes with high instabil-
ity between them, whereas real-world social transitions 
between two equilibrium states is rarely precipitous. 
Nevertheless, Figure 5a and 5b offer two insights into 
the dynamics of religious and nonreligious change. First, 
the transition from a dominantly supernatural religious 
to a dominantly post-supernatural secular population is a 
notably non-linear process in the model, which matches 
what happens in the real-world. In both cases, the change 
is gradual for a while but, when a threshold is passed, the 
entire society changes quickly to one in which supernatu-
ral religions are the special interest of a minority and the 
evolved tendencies to embrace supernatural worldviews 
are more widely contested within the culture. In the 
model, this is expressed in the “S”-shape of the transi-
tion curves of Figure 5, and the same type of transition 
was found in Brauer’s (2018) study of a similar transition 
in the United States (not directly related to supernatural 
worldviews), and also in our own data on Norway, dis-
cussed in the Validation section below. Second, the fact 
that a dominantly post-supernatural secular population 
tends to be significantly smaller than a dominantly super-
naturalist religious population will have important down-
stream implications for ecological sustainability, resource 
management, and economic practices.
Figure 5: a (left): equilibrium state for the post-supernatural secular (SecProp) and supernatural religious (1–SecProp) 
populations plotted against the technology parameter, showing sensitive dependence on the technology at the 
boundary between the two equilibrium regimes. b (right): the same with population numbers instead of percentages, 
which shows that a dominantly post-supernatural secular population is much smaller overall, with important sustain-
ability and ecological implications.
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The destabilization parameter (see upper left in 
Figure 3) is used to simulate the kind of disaster that 
could interfere with the key conditions under which a 
population moves in large numbers toward post-super-
natural secularism. An increase in the destabilization 
parameter lowers wellbeing, existential security, and edu-
cation. The effect of these dynamics is expressed through 
the series of plots in Figure 6. Each dot in Figure 6 rep-
resents the equilibrium state achieved in one complete 
run of the FOReST simulation, with the proportion of 
post-supernatural secular people on the vertical axis, 
the destabilization parameter on the horizontal axis, the 
promodernity influence of supernaturalist religion (PM) 
determining the panels, and the color intensity express-
ing technology level. For middling values of the pro-
modernity influence of supernatural religious worldviews 
(say, the third panel where 0.5 < PM < 0.6), destabiliza-
tion clearly drives down the post-supernaturalist secular 
proportion in all cases, though least when technology 
remains relatively high and most when the level of tech-
nology itself falls.
This feature of the model shows that the conditions nec-
essary for a majority post-supernatural secular population 
can be destabilized, after which the reverse transforma-
tion to a dominantly supernatural religious population 
can occur. This transformation is most dramatic when the 
disruption significantly reduces technological capability. 
This possibility of two-way traffic toward and away from 
post-supernaturalist secular worldviews and cultures is 
typically not envisaged within conventional secularization 
theory but it is a crucial aspect of FOReST.
We also ran simulation experiments to discover some of 
the conditions under which various levels of post-super-
natural secularism emerge and persist. Figure 7 indicates 
that the proportion of post-supernatural secular people is 
low (0 to 30 percent) in societies when pluralism, security, 
or education are low, and when freedom is low to medium. 
Medium to high levels of security, education, and plural-
ism are conditions for achieving a 30–60 percent level of 
post-supernatural secular people. The percentage of post-
supernatural secular people is high (60–90 percent) when 
pluralism, security, education, and pluralism are high. 
Only when all four variables (freedom, security, education, 
and pluralism) are very high do we find cases in which the 
proportion of post-supernatural secular people in a popu-
lation is very high (90–100 percent); this is a rare situation 
even today.
Finally, we simulated the process of religious change 
over time, to identify the effects of the key conditions 
first for strengthening and then for weakening. Figure 8 
depicts the result, showing the number of supernatural 
religious people and post-supernatural secular people 
changing with the strength of key conditions over cen-
turies (one model cycle per year) in a western nation that 
has navigated the transition (such as Norway) or is still 
navigating the transition (such as the USA). The time-
line is established arbitrarily but made meaningful as a 
representation of change during the modern period by 
periodic increases in the technology parameter (every 75 
years on average) while the simulation is running. For the 
first 400 years, key conditions strengthen (corresponding 
to the increasing technology parameter) and the religious 
population declines until it drops below the post-super-
natural secular population, following an S-curve. At that 
point, the destabilization parameter is raised to a high 
level to simulate a civilization-damaging disaster, driv-
ing down the key conditions and eventually reversing the 
population distribution.
Figure 6: FOREST scatter plots illustrating the impact of the destabilization parameter (horizontal axis) on the pro-
portion of post-supernatural secular people (vertical axis) for different levels of technology (color intensity) and the 
promodernity influence of supernatural religion (PM; in the panels).
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Validation
While this is fundamentally a theoretical research venture 
intended to illustrate an innovative method for explor-
ing the dynamics of social change, we have also tried to 
validate the computational simulation to the extent pos-
sible (just as our group did in another model of religious 
change; see Gore et al., 2018). In seeking to validate FOR-
eST against real-world data, however, we have been forced 
to acknowledge a serious difficulty. Data on most of the 
independent variables (parameters) is available for many 
Figure 8: FOReST simulation results showing the effect of (1) strengthening key conditions (years 0–400) and (2) a 
destabilizing event that weakens key conditions (after year 400).
Figure 7: FOREST simulation results showing the conditions under which various levels of secularism emerge and 
persist in a population. The vertical axis of each panel is the proportion of secular people, and this same variable 
distinguishes the panels (the cut-offs for panels are 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00). Freedom is on the horizontal axis, 
pluralism is color, education is shape, and existential security is size.
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nations since 1900 or thereabouts. The data most difficult 
to find is longitudinal measures of the dependent vari-
able, which is prevalence of supernatural worldviews – or, 
failing direct measures, reasonable proxies in the form of 
religious service attendance or private religious practices 
such as personal prayer. We have looked in vain for such 
data sources with the required longitudinal scope, ideally 
running back to the beginning of the twentieth century to 
cover the long transition process. We have concluded that 
survey data documenting the frequency of supernaturalist 
worldviews in a population over long periods of time does 
not exist for any country, including those such as Scan-
dinavian nations that appear to have transitioned from 
dominantly supernatural religious worldviews to domi-
nantly post-supernatural secular worldviews.
Data on religious affiliation for the last 120 years exists 
for several national settings but affiliation is not what 
matters in FOReST. In Norway, for example, the very large 
majority of people currently self-identify as Christian on 
census forms but the level of regular religious service 
attendance is extremely low. If David Voas (2009) is cor-
rect about his “fuzzy fidelity” thesis – and Brauer’s (2018) 
analysis certainly suggests that Voas is onto something 
important with his claim that different aspects of religi-
osity change at different speeds – we would expect offi-
cial religious self-identification to mask the underlying 
dynamics of change in religious and nonreligious world-
views and practices.
Going beyond census religious identification, measures 
of personal religious faith, religious service attendance, 
private religious practices, and orthodoxy of religious 
belief do exist, fragmentarily, for some time periods 
within deeply secularized countries. However, none of 
these four is a close proxy for the prevalence of super-
naturalism because evolutionarily stabilized tendencies 
in human cognition can sustain supernatural worldviews 
even when traditional religion is rejected. Hopefully data 
on service attendance, religious beliefs, private religious 
practices, and orthodoxy of religious beliefs, which has 
been collected for the past few decades in several national 
settings, will eventually accumulate to make analyzing 
the staggered dynamics of religious and nonreligious 
change possible for countries such as Norway where 
the post-supernatural secular transition is far along; for 
national settings such as the USA, which are not as far 
along in the secularization transition; and for national 
settings undergoing transition in the opposite direc-
tion. Even then, however, we would still not have a direct 
measure of the dependent variable we most need to eval-
uate FOReST in detail, namely, prevalence of supernatural 
worldviews. Very few surveys have attempted to measure 
supernaturalism on the scale of a population and almost 
none has any longitudinal depth. We are hopeful that the 
New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study, a longitudinal 
cohort study, will accumulate enough waves of the right 
kind of data to allow us to construct a dataset useful for 
validating FOReST (see New Zealand Attitudes and Values 
Study 2020).
Ultimately we decided to create a novel dataset by 
asking four experts in the modern history of religion in 
Norway to graph the prevalence of five dimensions of 
religiosity: personal religious faith, religious service par-
ticipation, private religious practices, orthodoxy of reli-
gious beliefs, and prevalence of supernatural worldviews 
(the one of immediate interest to us) in that country from 
1900 to 2020. The data we collected, along with longitu-
dinal census data on religious identification, is summa-
rized in Figure 9. The results suggest that (1) Norway has 
in fact transitioned from supernaturalism as a majority 
worldview to supernaturalism as a minority worldview; 
(2) the transition takes the form of an “S” curve, with 
slow decrease as supernaturalism remains dominant but 
decreases in prevalence, followed by a period of more 
rapid decrease through the critical majority-minority 50% 
level, followed in turn by a period of slow decrease as 
supernaturalism becomes increasingly uncommon; and 
(3) none of the five potential proxies for supernaturalism 
is ideal, with census data (the easiest to obtain over a long 
Figure 9: A summary of the consensus of four experts in modern religious history of Norway, estimating the change 
in six dimensions of religiosity over the last 120 years. Note the S-curve transition with the slope steepest in decades 
immediately following World War II (ended in 1945). Also note that, for this group of experts, the average of Personal 
Religious Faith and Private Religious Practices serves as a reasonable proxy for the estimated level of supernatural 
worldviews.
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period of time) being the worst and an average of personal 
religious self-identification and private religious practices 
being the best.
We use this expert-opinion dataset to validate quali-
tatively the transition dynamics on display in the com-
putational simulation (i.e. comparing Figure 8 and 
Figure 9). In both cases, passing through the 50% preva-
lence mark, the supernatural worldview curve has the 
steepest slope, indicating a gentle S-curve, so the expert 
consensus matches the geometry of the FOReST transition 
in Figure 8, as well as the findings of Brauer (2018) for the 
same transition in the United States.
The reason social scientists have not measured the 
prevalence of supernatural worldviews until very recently 
is worth noting. The importance of supernatural world-
views as a psychological construct only became evident 
with the advent of experiments in the cognitive science 
of religion demonstrating the presence in our species of a 
powerful cross-cultural tendency toward preferring super-
natural explanations; McCauley (2011) describes super-
naturalism as “maturationally natural” for our species. 
The maturational naturalness of the tendency to embrace 
supernaturalism makes it difficult for most individuals to 
change but it can be contested effectively, under certain 
circumstances (which FOReST identifies, by consolidating 
the six underlying theoretical pathways of religious and 
nonreligious change).
Figure 9 also presents the best simple proxy we could 
construct from the data we collected as an approximation 
to the expert estimates of the prevalence of supernatural 
worldviews, namely, the average of personal religious faith 
and private religious practices. The possibility that we may 
be able to derive a rough proxy from measures that have 
been collected more frequently than prevalence of super-
natural worldviews is promising for future validation 
efforts of models seeking to explain the transition from 
supernatural religious cultures to post-supernatural secu-
lar cultures. Of course, the candidate proxy itself would 
need to be validated in other settings and using different 
methodologies.
Discussion
The results of the FOReST simulation indicate that several 
conditions must hold for most people in a population to 
embrace a post-supernatural secular worldview and way 
of life. Though all variables interact because of feedback 
loops, we highlight the four most theoretically salient fac-
tors using the shaded box in Figure 1 and again at the 
top of Figure 3. The dynamics connected with these key 
variables are part of a complex system of interactions, but 
we can distinguish their effects.
•	 Heightened existential security, driven by effective 
economic and social practices, undermines the need 
to seek protection from supernatural agents and 
coalitions, decreasing the appeal of supernatural re-
ligious worldviews and increasing post-supernatural 
secularism.
•	 Heightened freedom of self-expression weakens the 
power of social prohibitions against acting on  personal 
convictions, removing economic and social penalties 
for both supernatural religious and post-supernatural 
secular forms of personal self-identification.
•	 Heightened scientific education erodes the plausi-
bility structures that support supernatural religious 
worldviews, while heightened humanistic education 
reinforces appreciation for the value of human quest-
ing and the feasibility of post-supernatural secular 
forms of social organization.
•	 Heightened pluralistic attitudes to cultural diversity 
diminish the plausibility of all exclusivist, supernatu-
rally authorized coalitions. Cultural pluralism, which 
is perhaps the most significant factor contributing to 
the extraordinary period of transformation we call 
modernity, has led to a global conversation about reli-
gion across cultural boundaries, rendering permeable 
almost all formerly internally incorrigible supernatu-
ral worldviews.
In the model, these conditions are strengthened when 
there is advanced technology, when there is high energy 
capture (efficient extraction of energy from the environ-
ment for food and culture), and when cultural history 
has produced dominant religious outlooks that foster the 
emergence of secular forms of socio-political organization 
and high levels of scientific and humanities education. 
This latter point is particularly important: some supernat-
ural religions help to give birth to the very conditions that 
undermine the supernatural worldviews on which tradi-
tional religious narratives depend. This point has been 
persuasively argued on historical grounds (Buckley 1987) 
and is built into the model’s Pro-Modernity Influence of 
Religion (PromodernityInflOfRel) parameter.
Important consequences flow from the identification 
of these four key conditions. Someone opposed to the 
emergence of a social order in which most of the popu-
lation holds a post-supernatural secular worldview could 
be inspired by the findings of FOReST to generate strate-
gies intended to avoid or weaken such an order. Relevant 
resistance strategies could include ensuring that children 
are educated locally, under the control of school boards 
that can suppress an accurate understanding of cosmol-
ogy or evolution; that plausibility structures remain 
strong within active and vibrant religious communities, so 
that exclusivist attitudes to religious authority can be con-
vincingly sustained; that social media and news outlets 
should be so fragmented that isolated communication 
flows can sustain the persuasiveness of supernatural out-
looks without having to confront types of discourse that 
undermine those outlooks; and that social disincentives 
to leave a religious community are as large as legally pos-
sible, which is easiest to achieve outside of large cosmo-
politan population centers in small-town settings. A more 
aggressive approach is also possible, seeking to overthrow 
modernity entirely, as the violent Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) aspires to do. Social destabilization 
on a scale sufficient to decrease the availability of high 
technology (and thereby block its downstream conse-
quences for existential security, freedom, education, and 
pluralism) should be enough to reverse the trend toward 
post-supernatural secularism. By contrast, someone who 
favored a post-supernatural secular worldview would have 
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to be on guard for precisely those kinds of destabilization 
maneuvers and work hard to preserve the conditions nec-
essary for the training of each new generation of children 
in how to contest the maturationally natural embrace of 
supernatural religious beliefs and behaviors.
Importantly, these four key conditions also create chal-
lenges and opportunities for extant religious traditions, 
placing pressure on supernatural beliefs and practices as 
well as presumably opening vectors for internal institu-
tional transformation in the direction of post-supernatu-
ral religious outlooks. Some religious communities may 
embrace the changing plausibility structures instead of 
resisting them, which would lead to revised conceptions 
of religion as post-supernaturalist. If the supply-side path 
has anything to commend it, and we think the empirical 
evidence suggests that it does, then we should expect reli-
gious communities in some contexts to adapt to chang-
ing worldviews, moving in a post-supernatural direction 
rather than standing idly by while more and more peo-
ple defect. The movement of religious naturalists – those 
who reject supernaturalism and religious authoritarian-
ism and yet still detect worship-worthy spiritual depths 
in reality – appears to be growing (for example, see 
ReligiousNaturalism.org). Similarly, new religious groups 
that are secular and spiritual yet strongly post-supernatu-
ralist and decidedly not traditionally religious are spring-
ing up everywhere (Heelas and Woodhead 2005; Langston 
et al. 2015).
Post-supernatural secular worldviews (as against secular 
forms of social organization) have probably always existed 
alongside supernatural religious postures as a minority 
position within the population. However, explicitly post-
supernatural secular worldviews were never dominant in 
any civilization throughout human history until recent 
decades. What does the future hold, barring the kind of 
destabilizing ecological or technological disaster that 
FOReST suggests might trigger reversion to supernatural 
religious cultures? A key question here is how stable a 
social order could be when secular rather than religious 
people are in the large majority.
The FOReST model indicates that it is difficult to pro-
duce and sustain a population in which post-supernatural 
secular postures are dominant because the relevant con-
ditions require a high level of energy input to the social 
system. Existential security can only remain high if energy 
capture is high and deprivation conditions are eliminated. 
Free self-expression requires technology and political 
practices that are robust enough to hold out against the 
chaos of individual opinions and the pernicious truth-
denial of social-media mayhem. Educational processes 
must train students how to overcome inborn cognitive 
biases toward supernaturalism. Cultural diversity must 
be welcomed rather than avoided. All of that takes energy 
captured from the natural environment and spent to sus-
tain the form of social organization, and the training of 
human beings to embrace ways of thought and action 
that are in some ways contrary to what is maturationally 
natural for them.
Because of this need for energy input to stabilize the 
post-supernatural social equilibrium, it is reasonable to 
suppose that a post-supernatural secular social order 
might be more vulnerable to catastrophic collapse. If 
even one of these conditions (high existential security, 
high free self-expression, high education, high cultural 
pluralism) begins to disintegrate, people find it more 
difficult to contest the evolved proclivities that have fos-
tered majority-supernatural religious social orders. Each 
new child is born into this world with similar cognitive-
emotional mechanisms and it is only neural plasticity 
and cultural entrainment that make it possible for a child 
to learn how to contest those tendencies, many of which 
all too easily lead to error (McCauley 2011). If a post-
supernatural secular social order destabilizes to the point 
that existential security is threatened, for example, then 
the entire system can revert to the civilizational form that 
has characterized most of human history: the dominance 
of supernatural religious worldviews and the sequester-
ing of non-supernatural outlooks to the margins of the 
social order. Figure 6 suggests that the reversion trans-
formation might be more or less dramatic, depending on 
other factors.
As we noted in the Introduction, post-supernaturalist 
secular postures (and a variety of forms of emergent 
social structures to support them) have expanded in 
Scandinavia and several other regions around the world 
(Zuckerman 2008, 2016). On the other hand, where any 
one of the four primary conditions for the emergence of 
a post-supernatural era is absent—that is, when existen-
tial security, personal freedom, education, or pluralism 
is low—supernaturalism still dominates the religious 
and spiritual imaginations of the prevailing social order. 
This could help to explain why the USA has moved more 
slowly toward secularism than Northern Europe and 
most other North Atlantic cultures: even though three 
of the four conditions are strongly present, the USA’s 
education system is largely regulated locally, prevent-
ing it from having the effects that high levels of scien-
tific and humanities education have had in other, more 
secularized cultures. The fact that a large majority of 
people in the USA reject the scientific consensus of evo-
lutionary theory (Pew Research Center 2014) shows how 
effective the weakening of just one of the four neces-
sary conditions can be in arresting the transformation in 
the direction of a dominantly post-supernatural secular 
population.
Conclusion
The point of FOReST and of this paper is theoretical in 
nature, seeking to demonstrate the possibility and use-
fulness of a synthesis of social-science theories of super-
natural religious and post-supernatural secular transitions 
and to identify the key factors that determine how these 
transitions unfold. We have not attempted to argue about 
the relative value of the supernatural religious posture 
that has long dominated human life in comparison to the 
post-supernatural secular posture that is expanding in 
some parts of the world in recent years. Rather, we have 
tried to show that the theoretical integration and causal 
architecture of the FOReST model does a serviceable job 
of explaining the two-way transition dynamics between 
populations that are primarily supernatural and those 
that are primarily post-supernatural. The FOReST model 
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helps to explain why secular cultures dominated by indi-
viduals with non-supernatural worldviews have been so 
rare in the history of human civilizations, and it illumi-
nates the pathways by which cultures can get there – and 
back again.
Additional File
The additional file for this article can be found as follows:
•	 Supplemental Material. AnyLogic source code for 
the FOReST model. https://github.com/centerform-
indandculture/FOReST.
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